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EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER IN CIVIL AND CRIM-
INAL PROCEEDINGS.
In our law, the word character has no single, well defined,
technical meaning. Sometimes it means actual character, disposi-
tion, what a person is, and sometimes it means reputed character,
reputation, community opinion as to character, what a person is
supposed to be. When used in the sense of nature or disposition,
sometimes it means the entire character, the "sum of the inherited
and acquired ethical traits which gave to a man his individuality,"
as when we speak of good or bad character generally; and some-
times it means a single trait of character, as when we speak of a
person's honesty, chastity, or veracity. Sometimes it has reference
to moral traits or qualities and sometimes not.
It is probably true, however, that in law, as in common speech,
the word character usually means moral character, and actual char-
acter, as distinguished from reputation; though from the fact that
reputation is in law the chief means of proving character, the
words character and reputation are frequently but improperly used
as if they were synonymous.
Character is what a person is, reputation is what the community
thinks he is; but evidence of the general reputation of a person
affords the basis for an inference as to the actual character; for
behind a good reputation usually there lies a good character, and
behind a bad reputation a bad character.
Evidence of character is admissible, under certain limitations
and for certain purposes, in civil as well as in criminal proceedings;
and it is the object of this article to state briefly some of the pre-
vailing rules governing its admissibility, and incidentally to note
some of the variations from those rules prevailing in some juris-
dictions.
The character sought to be proved may be that of a party to
the proceeding, or that of a witness therein, or that of a person
neither a witness nor a party to the proceeding.
Again character may be offered in evidence either (i) simply
to prove its existence as one of the facts in the case, or (2) to prove
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its existence as circumstantial evidence tending to prove some other
fact therein. In the one case, character is a disputed fact whose
existence may be proved by evidence, but which is neither offered
nor used as evidence of any other fact; while in the other case it
is offered and used as evidence, that is as the basis of an inference
to some other facts in the case.
The rules relating to the admissibility of character evidence may
be conveniently considered under three heads: (I) those relating
to its admissibility to prove the character of a party or of a third
person as one of the facts in the case; (II) those relating to its
admissibility to prove the character of a party or of a third person as
circumstantial evidence in the case; and (III) those relating to its
admissibility to prove the character of a witness.
I.
Cases where character may be proved as one of the facts in issue
will be first considered, and these are almost without exception,
civil cases. Just when, in civil cases, the character of a party is
said to be "in issue" is determined by precedent rather than by
principle.
At common law the character of the parties was held not to be
in issue in actions upon contract, and in most actions of tort, such
as trespass to land or goods, assault and battery, actions for negli-
gence, and some others; and this rule prevailed even in civil cases
charging crime or conduct grossly indecent or immoral; so that
the general rule in civil cases was that the character of the parties
is not in issue, and consequently evidence of it cannot be given.
"Putting character in issue is a technical expression, which does
not mean simply that the character may be affected by the result,
but that it is of peculiar importance in the suit itself, as the character
of the plaintiff in an action of slander, or that of a woman in an
action upon the case for seduction."'
Certain actions, however, were held at common law to put the
character of one or both of the parties "in issue" for certain pur-
poses, and in such actions the character of such party might be
proved as one of the facts in the case. The principal actions of
this kind were actions of slander and libel, breach of promise of
marriage, malicious prosecution and seduction.
In actions of slander and libel various questions have arisen
with respect to the admissibility of evidence of character. The
' Potter v. Sider, 23 Pa. St. 424.
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character of the defendant in such cases is not generally regarded
as being in issue. It has been held, however, that the defendant
could prove his own bad character in mitigation of damages;'
but the widely prevailing rule probably is that he can not.2
Whether the plaintiff in this class of cases can give evidence
of his own good character in the first instance, "not to sustain it
from attack but to prove its excellence," is a question upon which
the courts have differed. The prevailing rule, founded upon the
fact that good character, in the absence of anything to the contrary,
is taken for granted, is that he can not.
Evidence of the plaintiff's bad character is admissible in miti-
gation of damages on the ground that "a reputation already dam-
aged in the very point in controversy is not so valuable commercially
speaking as a reputation which is unspotted." 3  But whether such
evidence is admissible under the general issue alone, or whether
bad character must be expressly pleaded in mitigation, are questions
upon which the decisions have not been quite harmonious. The
widely prevailing rule is that it need not be expressly pleaded.
After evidence of the plaintiff's bad character has been given, the
plgintiff may of course give evidence of good character as bearing
upon the question of damages.
Whether the defendant, in mitigation of damages, may show
the plaintiff's general bad character, or only his bad character in
respect to the trait involved in the defamation, or may show both,
are questions upon which the courts are not quite agreed. Upon
principle it would seem that he should be permitted to do both, but
it can hardly be said that this is the prevailing rule. It is, however,
well settled in this class of cases that good or bad character, whether
general or in respect to some trait involved, can only be shown by
evidence of general reputation, and not by evidence of specific acts.'
In actions of breach of promise of marriage the character of the
plaintiff is generally held to be put in issue, at least for certain
purposes. Such an action impliedly asserts that the character of
the plaintiff is good, and harm to it is recognized as one of the
elements of damages therein. The plaintiff's want of chastity is,
under certain circumstances, a defense to the action. It may, as
a defense, be shown not only by general unchaste reputation, but
'Gates v. Meredith, 7 Ind. 44o.
2 Hastings v. Stetson, 13o Mass. 76.
3.Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa. St. 393.
4 In support of these statements with respect to defamation cases, see
i Greenleaf's Evidence, 16 ed., sec. 14d and cases cited, and also 18 Am. &
Eng. Enc. of Law, pp. iogg-IIoi.
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also by evidence of unchaste acts and conduct. In such a defense
unchaste character clearly means actual character rather than re-
puted character. When under such a defense evidence has been
given of plaintiff's bad character for chastity, in either or both
of the ways above mentioned, the plaintiff may, of course, give
evidence to contradict the evidence as to particular acts or conduct,
and also give evidence of general chaste reputation. The defendant
may also, in mitigation of damages, show the bad character of the
plaintiff for chastity, and his or her general bad moral character
by reputation evidence, and then the plaintiff may rebut this by
similar evidence of good reputation for chastity, and for good
moral character.
.Whether in actions of this kind the plaintiff can give evidence
of good character before it has been attacked in evidence is a
question upon which the decisions are not in entire harmony. On
principle, as good character is generally assumed in the absence
of anything to the contrary, it would seem that before it is attacked
in some way, evidence in support of it should be excluded.'
In actions for malicious prosecution, harm to the plaintiff's
character is usually one of the elements of damages involved in
the case. Where this is so the character of the plaintiff is held to
be put in issue, and the defendant may give evidence of the. plain-
tiff's general bad character, in mitigation of damages, while the
plaintiff, in rebuttal, may of course give evidence of his general
good character. Such evidence of good or bad character, is confined
to evidence of general reputation.2
In civil actions for seduction at common law by the father or
master the character of the woman for chastity is held to be in issue;
and this is true also in actions of this kind brought under statutes
in many of the States either by the woman or her parent or master;
indeed it is true generally in civil actions involving offenses against
chastity. In all such actions where damages are claimed on account
of injury to character, the bad character of the woman previous to
the seduction may be shown in mitigation of damages; and such
character may be shown not only by evidence of general reputation
but also by evidence of particular acts and conduct showing a want
of chastity. In the civil action for criminal conversation also, the
character of the woman, and that of the husband, are regarded as
being "in issue" under certain circumstances and for certain
purposes.
iUpon character evidence in this class of cases see 5 Cyc. p. 997.
2See cases cited in 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 699.
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In all of the foregoing classes of cases where character is held,
in effect, to be one of the facts to be proved in the case, its existence
may be proved, not as tending to prove some other fact in the case,
but simply as one of the facts involved in the issue. It is not
regarded as an evidential fact nor used as such.
II.
The cases where character is admitted as an evidential fact, and
the rules relating thereto, are next to be considered. In this class
of cases character is regarded as circumstantial evidence tending
to prove some other fact. "That a human being has a moral dis-
position or character of a certain sort is of more or less probative
value in -indicating the likelihood of his doing or not doing an act
of a related sort; for example, a disposition as to violence throws
light upon the probability of a violent killing, and a disposition as to
honesty on the probability of committing a fraud."'
Again the character of a person may afford a fair basis for an
inference as to some fact other than the conduct or acts of that
person; as for example in actions for malicious prosecution the
character of the plaintiff may have a bearing upon the knowledge
or belief of the defendant that reasonable grounds existed for in-
stituting the prosecution.
Evidence of character for purposes like the foregoing is admitted
in both civil and criminal cases, but the civil cases in which it is
admissible are comparatively few and they will be first considered.
The general rule in civil cases is that the character of the parties
is not admissible as evidence tending to prove their acts or conduct.
"Because of the usual slight probative value of a party's character,
and of its confusion of issues to little purpose, and for other reasons
variously stated by different judges and not easy to disentangle or
define, it has come to be generally accepted that the character of
a party in a civil cause cannot be looked to as evidence that he did
or did not do an act charged."'
Such evidence in civil cases is excluded, not only in cases where
it has little or no probative force, as in actions upon contract, but
also in actions where, if admitted, it might have considerable pro-
bative force, as in actions charging adultery or gross indecency or
flagrant immorality. Thus in a civil action for divorce charging
adultery against a wife, evidence of her good character was held
I Prof. Wigmore in Greenleaf's Evidence, i6 ed., vol. I, p. 38.
2 Prof. Wigmore in Greenleaf's Evidence, i6 ed., sec. i4b (4).
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to be inadmissible,' although if she had been prosecuted criminally
for the adultery, evidence of her good character would have been
admissible. In cases like this the rule that admits character as
evidence to prove or disprove adultery in the criminal proceeding,
and shuts it out when offered for the same purpose in the civil
proceeding seems to be illogical and inconsistent, but it is the widely
prevailing rule.2
While the weight of authority is still decidedly against the ad-
missibility of character as evidence of conduct in civil cases, yet in
civil actions charging crime or gross immorality, some courts have
admitted evidence of this kind; and possibly there is a tendency
in many courts to admit such evidence in that class of cases. In
civil cases then the general rule is that the character of the parties,
as an evidential fact, is excluded.
There are, however, a few instances in which character as an
evidential fact is admissible in civil cases, and some of these will
now be briefly considered. In actions for malicious prosecution
the defendant may give evidence of the general bad character of
the plaintiff, if known to the defendant before he instituted the
prosecution, as bearing upon the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct in instituting such prosecution. "It would certainly require
less stringent proof to make out probable cause for prosecuting a
man of general bad character for larceny, than one who maintained
a good character, and followed an occupation for a livelihood
altogether lawful."'
On the other hand the defendant may in such cases prove his
general good character known to the defendant to establish plaintiff's
claim that there was no probable cause for the prosecution. "To
prove that the attack was made without probable cause, we think
he should be permitted to show his good reputation known to the
defendant when the prosecution was commenced."
'  The courts
are generally agreed as to this matter. The only evidence of char-
acter admissible in such cases is good or bad general reputation.
In actions against a master for employing or retaining in his
employment, an incompetent servant, the plaintiff may prove the
general character of the servant for incompetency, as evidence bear-
'Humphrey v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. i16.
2 The early case of Ruan v. Perry, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 12o, held that in
actions of tort charging gross depravity and fraud evidence of defendant's
good character was admissible; but that case was overruled in Gough v. St.
John, 16 Wend. 647, and has been generally disregarded.
3 Martin v. Hardesty, 27 Ala. 458.
4 Mclntire v. Levering, 148 Mass. 546.
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ing upon the knowledge of the master of such incompetency. In
such cases the only evidence admissible is usually that of general
reputation, and it is used as the basis of an inference as to the
master's knowledge.- In some States the master is held liable in
such cases if he had the means of knowing and ought to have known
of the incompetency. 2  Some courts, in a certain class of cases
involving the issue of negligence, admit evidence of the person's
character for carelessness or prudence whose conduct is in question,
as bearing upon the question whether be was negligent or not; but
the widely prevailing rule excludes such evidence.'
There are a few other civil cases where character is admissible
as circumstantial evidence of some other fact in the case, but the
above are the principal instances of this kind.
Character as circumstantial evidence of acts or conduct is mucb
more freely admitted in criminal than in civil cases. "Formerly
evidence of the defendant's good character in criminal proceedings,
was admitted in capital cases only, and that in favorem vitae; but
such evidence is now admitted in all cases where the character of
the defendant is in jeopardy."'
It is now well settled that the accused, in substantially all crim-
inal prosecutions, may give evidence of his good character in proof
of his innocence; and that when he has done so, and not until then
the State may give evidence of his bad character. If the accused
fails to offer evidence of his good character no presumption arises
that he is guilty of the offense charged, or that he is of bad char-
acter. 5
Formerly it was quite generally held that such evidence on the
part of the accused would be of little or no avail to him save in
doubtful cases,6 but the widely prevailing rule to-day is that such
evidence is admissible and is a fact to be considered in all cases in
favor of the accused. 7
The good or bad character of the accused in such cases, can be
1 See cases in note upon this point in 25 L. R. A. 71o.
2 Monahan v. Worcester, i50 Mass. 439.
3See cases cited by Prof. Wigmore in i Greenleaf, Evidence, i6 ed.,
P. 41.
4 Starkie on Evidence, 2 ed., vol. 2, p. 215.
SPeople v. Evans, 72 Mich. 367.
6 Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295; McDaniel v. State, 8 Sr.. &
M. 4oi; Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502.7 Harrington v. State, ig Ohio St. 264; Harmey v. Commonwealth, 116
Pa. St. 322; Commonwealth v. Leonard, 24o Mass. 473; People v. Garbutt,
17 Mich. 9.
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proved only by evidence of general reputation, and not by evidence
of particular acts or conduct. Evidence of good character, in
criminal as in civil cases, may be negative in its nature, for the best
character is often the least talked about.' The accused may not
only offer evidence of general good character, he may also offer
evidence of specific traits of character; but such traits can only be
proved by evidence of general reputation. The specific trait, offered
to be proved, however, must correspond with the trait involved in
the offense charged, or it will be inadmissible because irrelevant.
Thus in a prosecution for homicide the accused was permitted to
give evidence of his general reputation "for peace and quietude";'
while in a prosecution for assault and battery evidence of his
reputation for veracity was excluded as irrelevant
3
The accused, of course, may become a witness in the case on
his own behalf, and when he does so, his character as witness may
be attacked and defended in the same way that the character of
any witness may be impeached or supported; but this will be con-
sidered later. The character of third persons, neither parties nor
witnesses, is sometimes admissible in criminal cases, as circum-
stantial evidence, of acts or conduct. The principal instances of
this kind are the following.
In prosecutions for rape the question of consent on the part
of the woman is usually an important one; and evidence of her
character for chastity is admissible as bearing upon the probability
of consent.' The courts in this country seem to be agreed that
in a prosecution for rape or an attempt to ravish, the woman's bad
character for chastity may be shown by witnesses, and also that if
she becomes a witness she may be examined as to her previous
connection with the prisoner; but they disagree as to whether acts
of connection with other men may be shown, and if so by what
kind of evidence. The same agreement and disagreement measur-
ably exists in actions for seduction. I In a prosecution for carnal
knowledge of a girl under sixteen and "therefore chaste," the girl's
character for chastity must be proved by the State.' In an indict-
ment for an indecent assault the accused may show that the reputa-
tion of the woman for chastity is bad.7
'Reg. v. Cary, 1o Cox. C. C. 25; Hussey v. State, 87 Ala. I2i; State v.
Lee, 22 Minn. 4o7.
2State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa 76.
3 Morgan v. State, 88 Ala. 223.
4 State v. Foreshore, 43 N. H. 89; Regina v. Ryan, 2 Cox Cr. C. 15.
5 See Chase's Stephen's Digest, article 134, and cases cited in note 2.
0 People v. Mills, 94 Mich. 63o.
7 Comnmonwealth v. Kendall, 113 Mass. 210.
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In prosecutions for homicide where the accused claims that the
killing was in self-defence, and the question arises whether rhe
deceased was the aggressor, the character of the deceased for vio-
lence and turbulence, is held to be admissible, as circumstantial
evidence bearing upon that question. In this class of cases it is
of no consequence whether the accused at the time had lmowledge
of the character of the deceased or not.
In this class of cases also, when the question arises whether
the accused in what he did acted in reasonable apprehension of an
attack, evidence of the character of the deceased as a man of violence,
if known to the accused at the time, is admissible as circumstantial
evidence bearing upon the question of reasonable apprehension.
These last two rules are of comparatively recent origin, and are by
no means universally adopted, and the courts that have already
adopted them are not fully agreed as to the conditions and limita-
tions under which the evidence should be admitted.'
III.
There remains to be considered very briefly the rules relating
to the admissibility of character as evidence bearing upon the cred-
ibility of a witness. The trait of character sought for in a witness
is truthfulness, veracity, disposition to tell the truth, at the time
of testifying.
The existence of this trait is assumed or taken for granted to
begin with; and until the veracity of the witness is attacked in
some way, evidence of his good character for veracity will not be
received. This is the widely prevailing rule, but a few courts
have made an exception to it in cases where the witness is in the
situation of a stranger;2 but in such cases the evidence is cor.fined
to evidence of veracity, and evidence of general good character is
not admissible.3 When the character of a witness has oeen assailed
by the opposite party, evidence of his good character may of course
be given in rebuttal.
A mere conflict of testimony, however, is not such an assault
upon the veracity of a witness as will justify the admission of
evidence in support of veracity; nor will a mere attack upon the
veracity of a witness by counsel in argument, be ground for the
'For a good account of these two rules see Greenleaf on Evidence, i6
ed., vol. I, pp. 41, 43, and cases there cited.
2Rogers v. Moore, io Conn. 12; Merriam v. R. R. Co., 20 Conn. 345;
Crook v. State, 27 Texas 198.
3 Merriam v. R. R. Co., 2o Conn. 345.
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admission of evidence in support of the character of the witness '
Upon the question whether impeaching and supporting evidence
must be confined to evidence affecting veracity alone, or whether it
may include evidence of general good or bad moral character, the
courts are not at all agreed. "The fundamental trait desirable in
a witness is the disposition to tell the truth, and hence the trait of
character that should naturally be shown in impeaching him is his
bad character for veracity. But there has always been more or less
support for the use of bad general character, i. e. the man as a
whole, not specifically the trait of veracity-as necessarily involving
an impairment of veracity. This was the original English doctrine;
but it was replaced in the early i8oos by the first mentioned princi-
ple, with the exception that the witness is allowed to base his state-
ment as to the other's veracity, upon his knowledge of the other's
general character. In this country the better doctrine that the
trait of veracity only could be considered was early introduced; and
this is the rule in the great majority of jurisdictions." In a great
many States, however, evidence of general bad character is ad-
missible to impeach a witness.
Whether the evidence offered to impeach or support the char-
acter of a witness is that of character for veracity alone, or that of
general moral character, the object is one and the same, namely, to
ascertain the character of the witness for truth. Speaking gen-
erally such evidence either of the trait veracity, or of general moral
character is confined to evidence of reputation.
There is, however, one well-known exception to this rule in
case the witness has been convicted of crime. In such case the
conviction may generally be shown to affect the credibility of the
witness. This is generally provided for by statute. As to whether
such conviction can be proved only by the production -of the record,
or whether it may be proved by questioning the witness and his
admissions, the courts are not agreed, nor are they agreed as to
the crimes that may thus be used to affect the credibility of a wit-
ness.3  Quite frequently the statute removing conviction of crime
as a ground of incompetency determines the kind of crime that
may be used to affect credibility.
So, too, the courts are not agreed upon the form of question
ITedens v. Schumers, 112 Ill. 263. "Where witnesses contradict each
other, the character of the one is as much impeached as that of the other."
People v. Bush, 65 Cal. i29.2 Prof. Wigmore in i Greenleaf on Evidence, 16 ed., sec. 46ia. See
also the cases cited there by him.
3 State v. Randolph, 24 Conn. 362; Card v. Foot, 57 Conn. 437.
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that may be put to the impeaching or sustaining witness. It is
generally agreed that such witness may be asked whether he knows
the reputation of the witness whose veracity is in question and
whether it is good or bad; and the dispute' is as to whether he may
further be asked "From what you know of the reputation or char-
acter of the witness would you believe him under oath ?" Perhaps
the preponderating weight of authority is in favor of permitting
such question.'
With the single exception of convictions for crime the courts
are generally agreed that general reputation in cases of impeachment
cannot be established by proof of specific acts, whether brought out
upon the direct or upon the cross-examination. As a general rule,
with but few exceptions, reputation evidence must be confined to
evidence of reputation as to veracity or general moral character,
and cannot extend to proof of specific traits other than veracity. A
few courts have held that a woman's character for veracity might
be impeached by proof -of her had reputation for chastity 2  But
the widely prevailing rule is the other way.
Evidence of reputation in cases of this kind should have refer-
ence to the character of the witness at or near the time when his
,testimony is given, and should be confined to the neighborhood
where he resides and is known, and the impeaching or sustaining
witness should ot course be ordinarily from that neighborhood, and
be able to speak to a reputation existing ante litam motam; but the
settlement of questions in regard to these and many other matters
of a like nature, is usually left largely to the discretion of the trial
court. When a witness has testified to the bad reputation of another,
he may be asked, on cross-examination, to name the persons whom
he has heard speak of the reputation and what they said about it.
A party to a civil action, or the accused in a criminal case, may
become a witness in such action or case, and when he does so, of
course his character as witness may be impeached or bustained
substantially like that of any other witness. By taking the stand
in his own behalf, the accused, in most of the States, is hcd to
bring himself within all the rules applicable to other witnesses;
and he may be shown not only to have a bad reputation for veracity,
but in many States, to have a general bad moral character. This
1For the differences in practice as to this point see Prof. Wiguore's
statement in i Greenleaf on Evidence, 16 ed., sec. 461c, and cases there cited.
2 State v. Shields, 13 Mo. 236; R. R. v. Anthony, 43 Ind. 183; Birming-
ham Ry. v. Hale, go Ala. 8.
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matter is in many of the States regulated to some extent by statute.'
As a witness the accused may be impeached by reputation evi-
dence of character, by cross-examination as to character, by proof
of conviction of crime, and in any of the ways that a witness may
be impeached. He is, however, not obliged to answer incriminating
questions except to the extent that he has waived his privilege to
refuse to answer such questions. To what extent the accused, by
taking the stand in his own behalf, waives his privilege, is a question
about which the courts are not agreed.
In the case of an accused person, however, the good or bad
character proved in favor of or against him as a witness cannot be
used as the basis of an inference of his guilt or innocence of the
crime charged against him. It cannot be used to prove that he did
or did not do the act, but only to shake his credit as a witness; and
a refusal to charge to this effect is error.'
The foregoing rules relating to the admissibility of character
evidence to impeach or support the veracity of witnesses are the
principal rules on that subject.
The rules relating to the admissibility of evidence of character,
whether as a fact in issue, as an evidential fact, or as a mode of
impeaching or supporting the veracity of a witness, are but a small
part of the law of evidence; and this cursory survey of that part,
while it discloses a substantial agreement in the decisions as to
many of the principal rules, also shows that there appears to be
altogether too many rules about which the courts are not agreed,
and a much greater want of harmony, than is at all necessary or
desirable in a matter of this kind.
Perhaps this lack of harmony is in some instances, more apparent
than real, but its existence in regard to many rules is too real to be
doubted, and too great not to be regretted. . Dazid Torrance.
'For the cases bearing upon this matter see note to People v. Tice.
i5 L. R. A. 6og.
2State v. Broderick, 61 Vt. 42i.
